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INTRODUCTION 
One of the cornerstones of democracy is the opportunity for all citizens to participate in 
the electoral process, yet national data on political behavior demonstrates that this is not the case. 
While the average rate of voter turnout among industrialized nations has been estimated as high as 
80%, rates in the U.S. are significantly lower (as low as 54%) (Powell 1986). Rates are even lower 
among certain sectors of the population, such as young voters, who comprised only 29% of all 
voters in 2014 (File 2015). Some of the largest gaps in voter rates are between racial groups: both 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic black sub-groups have had lower turnout rates in almost every national 
election for decades (File 2015). The size of these gaps varies, but is consistently substantial: since 
1978, whites have had turnout rates that are between 5 and 11 percent higher than black citizens, 
for example. One notable exception to this trend was in 2008, when black voters turned out at a 
higher rate than both white and Hispanic voters for the first time in history (File 2015)..  
Additionally, certain sectors of the population are disproportionately represented as 
political leaders. A recent report found that women make up less than a quarter of the political 
leadership in every branch of local, state, and federal government in the United States (Lawless 
and Fox 2012). Meanwhile, “more than 1.2 million African Americans in 175 communities across 
the country” have been found to be underrepresented in local leadership—that is, their community 
city councils do not reflect the demographic composition of the community itself. In short, the 
disproportionate underrepresentation of some groups persists, raising questions of access and 
opportunity to elections.  Scholarship demonstrates close relationships between social and political 
inequalities, and specifically a number of strong connections between minority status, political 
efficacy, and participation(Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Emig, Hesse, and Fisher 1996; Olsen 1970; 
Pasek et al. 2008). However, the 2008 presidential election brought with it an unprecedented 
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consideration— a major party nominee who identified as a racial minority. Racial considerations 
in the political process are well-documented in the literature(Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Emig et al. 
1996; Gay 2001; Olsen 1970; Schaffner 2011), but it is unclear how Barak Obama’s candidacy 
and subsequent election have affected black Americans’ choice to participate in the political 
process, as well as their feelings of political efficacy both before and after the election.  
The purpose of this project is to explore the ways in which the presence of the first-ever 
major-party black candidate for president in the U.S. affected well-established patterns in the 
relationship between race, political efficacy, and political participation. I conducted secondary data 
analysis using the American National Election Survey’s 2008 Time-series pre- and post-election 
studies. Based on the extant literature on political efficacy, participation, and race, I ask four 
research questions: 1) How do racial minorities’ perceptions of political efficacy compare to those 
of white individuals?; 2) How does political participation differ between racial minorities and 
whites?; 3) What is the connection between perceptions of efficacy and political participation?; 
and 4) How does an individual’s choice of candidate affect his or her feelings of political efficacy?  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Direct and Indirect Effects: Race and Political Efficacy 
The use of the term “political efficacy” in the scholarship has been broad and variable. 
Political efficacy refers to an individual’s “perception of their political capacities” (Beaumont 
2011). Scholars usually distinguish between  internal and external efficacy (Hayes and Bean 1993; 
Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) provide a useful narrative 
regarding this distinction: 
Of the many indicators of general political attitudes developed in the 1950s, sense 
of political efficacy is one of the most theoretically important and frequently used. 
At the same time, however, there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which efficacy is measured. One problem was solved in the 1970s, when 
scholars (following Lane 1959) came to recognize that political efficacy contains 
at least two separate components: (1) internal efficacy, referring to beliefs about 
one's own competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics, and 
(2) external efficacy referring to beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental 
authorities and institutions to citizen demands. (P. 1407-1408) 
 
The fostering of efficacy has been attributed to a variety of factors, but while there is no 
primary predictor, the collective literature on the subject clearly shows that individuals of minority 
races are less likely to feel political efficacy than whites (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Emig, Hesse, 
and Fisher 1996). A significant body of scholarship specifically highlights how race predicts lower 
feelings of efficacy among minorities. In a review of 8 surveys measuring political efficacy and 
trust, Abramson (1972) discover overwhelmingly lower feelings of both among black 
schoolchildren. Rodgers (1974) discusses this phenomenon with an explanation that focuses on 
external efficacy:  
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It is of considerable importance that this study has found that the low political 
efficacy and high political cynicism of the black respondents does not reflect 
feelings of personal inadequacy. Instead these attitudes best reflect black 
evaluations of their position in the political hierarchy. The implications of blacks 
feeling that their deprivation is a result of systemic rather than personal factors, are 
obvious. (P. 280) 
Limited perceptions of political efficacy among racial minorities can be inferred even in 
the writings of scholars who do not mention race; many of the non-racial factors relevant to 
efficacy are historically limited among minority groups. Beaumont (2011), for instance, focuses 
her research on certain elements of an individual’s background, including the role of 
socioeconomic status, civic resources, and sociopolitical learning, finding that all three of these 
concepts are positively related to efficacy perceptions. Inequalities in education also exacerbate 
this political inequality (Beaumont 2011; Pasek et al. 2008): Beaumont emphasizes the democratic 
benefits of education, but explains that “despite wishful thinking, current education practices do 
not create an “aristocracy of everyone” (2011: 229). In other words, socioeconomic, civic, and 
political resources are not equally available to all, and such divisions often occur over racial lines. 
Inequalities in education lead to such resource advantages, which in turn lead to disparities in 
political efficacy. 
In addition to resources, certain aspects of one’s social context, present more in some 
communities than others, have been demonstrated to play a role in efficacy perceptions (Anderson 
2010; Steinberger 1981). Anderson’s study, for instance, uses a well-established “sense of 
community” index popularized in community psychology to demonstrate the strong positive effect 
that an individual’s feeling of community support has on his or her efficacy. Community 
psychologists have often demonstrated that perceptions of community defined by this index are 
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racially disparate, and that feelings of community are particularly lower among African-Americans 
(BeLue et al. 2001; Lambert and Hopkins 1995). 
Considering a long history of economic, social, and political adversity, it is unsurprising 
that Americans from minority groups acknowledge an unfortunate “political reality” (Rodgers, 
1974), and become more cynical as a result. The combined effect of this cynicism and the many 
other predictors is that, as a whole, political efficacy is much lower among racial minorities. To 
address this issue, I test my first hypothesis: (H1) Racial minorities will have lower perceptions of 
political efficacy than white respondents.  
 
Unequal Efficacy, Unequal Participation: Race, Efficacy, and Political Participation  
 It seems only natural to draw a causal connection between this inequality of efficacy and a 
similar inequality in political behavior—a connection that is supported by an abundant body of 
literature. Whereas efficacy refers ideas or perceptions, “political participation” or “democratic 
participation” refers to behavior, and includes any actions that one might take in order to become 
directly involved in the political sphere, including elections and voting, demonstrations and rallies, 
canvassing, lobbying, meeting with or working for candidates and political leaders, running for 
office, among others. 
 There is a strong connection between perceived efficacy and political participation, which 
can be seen in explorations of voter decline (such as Cassel and Hill 1981). These studies attribute 
falling turnout rates to increased apathy about politics (an indicator or low political efficacy) and 
highlight factors such as education—often found to be responsible for higher levels of political 
efficacy—as an element that combats decline by boosting voter turnout rates. Similarly, research 
explores how political participation increases along with similar increases in education (Pasek et 
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al. 2008) and critical thinking skills, two indirect indicators of internal political efficacy (Guyton 
1988). 
 Scholarship also ties together efficacy and race by arguing that both one’s perception of 
political efficacy and one’s racial identity impact the motivation and frequency of an individual’s 
participation in the democratic electoral process (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Cassel and Hill 1981; 
Emig et al. 1996; Guyton 1988; Pasek et al. 2008). Bobo and Gilliam (1990) use survey data to 
show higher rates of sociopolitical participation among Black citizens in “high-empowerment 
areas”—measured by the presence of minority holders of public office, which the authors argue 
confirms that “a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision 
making” (378). Empowerment defined in this way is no doubt inspired by internal conceptions of 
efficacy, but, in response to Bobo and Gilliam’s findings, Emig et al. (1996) proposed an expanded 
definition of empowerment that included several more indicators of both internal and external 
political efficacy: 
We strongly argue for an expansion and extension of their operational definition to 
include such factors as (1) black representation below the office of mayor, including 
appointed as well as elected officials; (2) participation and involvement 
comparisons; (3) perceptions of local government’s responsiveness to various 
groups’ needs; (4) feelings of having personal influence in decision making; and 
(5) the possibility of strong black support for white incumbents. (P. 274)  
It is possible to see how the elements in this expanded definition fall into “internal” and “external” 
categories of efficacy. Representation, participation, and involvement are all demonstrations of 
one’s confidence in their own ability to affect change, while responsiveness is a perception that 
relies on the behavior of others. Emig et al. use this expanded definition to conclude that their 
sample, which according to Bobo and Gilliam would have been considered to have low levels of 
empowerment, in fact has high levels of empowerment (and therefore efficacy), explaining the 
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more frequent political participation observed. These studies demonstrate the direct connection 
between efficacy and participation, and attribute low levels of participation among black citizens 
to similarly low levels of internal and external political efficacy.  
A number of indirect, mediating factors also help to explain racial disparities in political 
behavior (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1972). Socioeconomic status has 
often been a point of contention for scholars who debate political trends: Olsen (1970) concludes 
that blacks are more likely to participate in every aspect of the political process if socioeconomic 
status is controlled for. The strength of socioeconomic status as a predictor of behavior is made 
clear by research that highlights the unequal distribution of resources to racial groups. Sylester and 
McGlynn (2010) elaborate on Beaumont’s idea that unequal access is the source of many political 
inequalities by shedding light on a more recent resource: the internet. Using survey data from a 
2007 Pew study, Sylvester and McGlynn conclude that “physical location continues to play a key 
role in levels of access to broadband technology and that increased home internet use is associated 
with a significantly higher probability of contacting government officials in various ways” (2010: 
64). Not dissimilar is Teney and Hanquinet’s (2012) multidimensional analysis of a survey among 
Belgian youth, in which the authors draw a connection between high social capital and high 
political participation. Of particular note is their conclusion that youth with a high socioeconomic 
status and diverse social capital are more likely to engage in political activities (1224).  
Olsen’s (1970) conclusions about the importance of socioeconomic status to lead to several 
theoretical explanations for black/white differences in political behavior. He assesses two 
competing theoretical explanations for the pattern. Olsen first discusses a compensation theory, 
which argues that African Americans are making up for racial discrimination with increased 
political participation. On the other hand, the scholar proposes that this pattern of increased 
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participation among African Americans might be explained by what he calls the “ethnic 
community” theory of participation, which posits that participation results from an inclination to 
conform to the behaviors of the community with which they identify (1970: 684). Shingles (1981) 
clarifies, “the primary reason black consciousness has such a dramatic effect on political 
participation is that it contributes to the combination of a sense of political efficacy and political 
mistrust which in turn induces political involvement” (77). 
 Over time, however, scholars became dissatisfied with explanations of the relationship 
between race and political participation that relied so heavily on what became referred to as “group 
solidarity” (Chong and Rogers 2005; Liu, Austin, and Orey 2009; Mattis et al. 2004; Stokes 2003), 
arguing a decline in the direct relationship between solidarity and voter turnout. Models testing 
the influence of “racial solidarity” as a quantified predictor variable demonstrate a weakened 
relationship between the two concepts as time went on. These criticisms have inspired a more 
detailed exploration of the solidarity concept by Chong and Rogers (2005), distinguishing between 
group consciousness and group identity, and have redoubled an emphasis specifically on group 
consciousness as a predictor of voting as a form of political participation.  
This adjusted theory of race and political participation fits in well with recent empirical 
findings, such as that of Liu et al. (2009), who conclude that social capital (in the form of church 
attendance) was the most significant predictor of voting among African-Americans. Accepting as 
given that increased social capital facilitates racial consciousness, the explanatory power of racial 
consciousness as a predictor of political participation is clear. This study further shows that social 
and economic inequalities that often affect racial minorities result in inequalities in the political 
sphere. Building on this literature, I test two additional hypotheses: (H2) Racial minorities will 
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have lower rates of political participation than white respondents; and (H3) Respondents’ lowered 
efficacy will result in similarly lowered political participation 
 
The Exception to the Rule: the Role of a Candidate’s Minority Status 
 A summary of the above literature describes a “vicious cycle” with regard to race, political 
participation, and political efficacy. Literature on political efficacy affirms that social inequalities 
individuals may confront in the U.S. are most often faced by racial minorities, directly translating 
into political inequalities. Specifically, racial minorities adopt a pessimistic (albeit, arguably, 
realistic) perspective on their political position, and have lower levels of trust and efficacy as a 
result. However, research also finds that perceptions of political efficacy are directly related to 
participatory actions, and it is perhaps unsurprising that in behavior, too, individuals of minority 
status are lower than their white counterparts. These findings are particularly discouraging when 
we consider the capacity for change by political actors, and the resulting implication that racial 
minorities, who suffer the most at the hands of the status quo, struggle to find the agency or ability 
to change it. In this way, we see a daunting cycle of low efficacy and low participation that must 
be broken in order to make social and political change.  
One way to break this vicious cycle has presented itself more in recent political elections. 
Scholars note that increases in black empowerment result in a corresponding shift in traditional 
black-white differences in political participation. Some literature even suggests that political 
leaders are in fact more effective if they share minority characteristics with the community that 
they lead (Mansbridge 1999). Other research examines Obama’s candidacy and subsequent 
election (Block 2011; Powers 2013; Schaffner 2011) most of which primarily discusses the 
necessity of the black vote during Obama’s election to office. Our understanding of the impact of 
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a president’s minority status is limited given the historic and unprecedented nature of Obama’s 
candidacy for president. However, similar research exploring the presence of minority leaders in 
local and state governments, as well as in other branches of the federal government, supports the 
insights into the effect that a leader’s racial identity has on typical feelings of efficacy and 
participation. As discussed above, Bobo and Gilliam’s (1990) analysis of national sample survey 
data uses the presence of black elected officials to public office as a metric to demonstrate “high 
empowerment,” and discovers that blacks with high feelings of empowerment have much higher 
levels of political participation. From this they conclude that “black empowerment, whatever 
heightened mobilization this feat initially requires, has broad and lasting consequences on how 
often, and why, blacks become active participants in the political process” (1990: 387). Gay (2001) 
demonstrates this pattern specifically with regards to voting by examining eight congressional 
districts in which African Americans are elected to congress, and where levels of voting decline 
among whites while they increase among blacks. To contribute to this line of research, this study 
tests a fourth and final hypothesis: (H4) Respondents who voted for Barak Obama in 2008 will 
have increased levels of political efficacy after the 2008 election.  
 
Conclusions from Literature 
 The goal of this project was to explore the intersections between race, efficacy, and political 
behavior. The scholarship outlined above makes certain connections apparent. Minority status has 
been shown to negatively impact perceptions of political efficacy, both directly, through the 
harmful stigmas and political inequalities that affect members of racial groups, and indirectly, 
through the resources that are afforded to some racial groups and not others. Both political efficacy 
and race have, in turn, been shown to negatively impact political behavior. However, there is also 
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a body of research that suggests that these well-established trends might be affected by the 
presence of a candidate who identifies as a member of a minority racial group. So, I tested these 
connections with four research hypotheses: (H1) Racial minorities will have lower perceptions of 
political efficacy than white respondents; (H2) Racial minorities will have lower rates of political 
participation than white respondents; (H3) Respondents’ lowered efficacy will result in similarly 
lowered political participation; (H4) Respondents who voted for Barak Obama in 2008 will have 
increased levels of political efficacy after the 2008 election. In the section that follows, I outline 
the methods used to research these hypotheses.  
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METHODS 
Sample 
My empirical analyses are based on data from the American National Election Survey’s 
(ANES) 2008 Time-Series study.  This survey is conducted through face-to-face interviews with 
a nationally representative sample of eligible American voters.  The Time-Series ANES is 
especially useful for its implementation of both pre- and post-election surveys, which allows for 
comparative analyses of respondents’ descriptive data.  In 2008, the survey was administered to 
over 2,000 respondents; my analyses restricted to respondents with valid responses on survey items 
used.  Depending on the “group” analyzed (see below) samples sizes are 925 (Group A) 948 
(Group B) and a total of 1873 for pooled analyses. 
 
Variables 
Political efficacy was measured using four survey question in the ANES.  The ANES 
randomly grouped respondents into groups A and groups B.  Respondents in each group were 
asked slightly different versions of the four efficacy items in both the pre-and post-election 
Number Group Question Phrasing Response Phrasing Concept Internal/External
1 A
“Sometimes, politics and government seem so 
complicated that a person like me can’t really 
understand what’s going on.” 
“Agree Strongly” to “Disagree Strongly”
 
Complicated
Internal
2 A
“I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of 
the important political issues facing our country” 
“Agree Strongly” to “Disagree Strongly” Understand Internal
3 A
“Public officials don’t care much what people like 
me think”
“Agree Strongly” to “Disagree Strongly” Care External
4 A
“People like me don’t have any say about what 
the government does” 
“Agree Strongly” to “Disagree Strongly” Say Internal
5 B
“How often do politics and government seem so 
complicated that you can’t really understand 
what’s going on?” 
“All the time” to “Never” 
 
Complicated
Internal
6 B
“How well do you understand the important 
political issues facing our country?” 
“Extremely Well” to “Not Well at All” Understand Internal
7 B
“How much do officials care what people like you 
think?” 
“A great deal” to “Not at all” Care External
8 B
“How much can people like you affect what the 
government does?” 
“A great deal” to “Not at all” Say Internal
Table 1: List of Efficacy Measures
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surveys.  For group A the response categories ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, 
while for group B responses that ranged from “never” to “all of the time.”  
Voting is a binary variable coded “1” for individuals who voted for president in 2008 and 
“0” for individuals who did not vote in 2008. Candidate is compares individuals who voted for 
Obama (coded “1”) to individuals who voted from McCain (coded “0”). 
Race is captured with three binary variables.  Black, Hispanic and other each compare 
individuals reporting this respective racial background to white respondents.  Age is measured in 
number of years.  Female compares females (coded “1”) to males.  Married (coded “1”) compares 
married respondents to all non-married respondents.  Children is a count for the number of children 
each respondent has.  South compares individuals residing in the southern United States to all other 
regions. 
 Based on the literature’s discussion of socioeconomic status’ impact on racial disparities 
in voting, I also controlled for the concept in some models to estimate the size of this effect. In 
lieu of a composite socioeconomic status variable, I used three variables that capture different 
elements of the broader idea: unemployed compares individuals who reported not having currently 
employment (coded “1” to individuals who were currently working. Income is an ordinal variable 
ranging from 1”Less than $3,000” to 25 “$150,000 or more”). Finally, bachelor’s degree compares 
individuals with a bachelor’s degree or higher to all others. 
  
Analytic Strategy 
 I first present descriptive statistics for all analysis variables.  Multivariate analyses proceed 
in three phases.  First, I estimate a series of ordinal probit models for pre-election political efficacy.  
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Because no respondent answered all items, I present eight models, one model for each of the four 
efficacy items in each group.  These models take the general form of: 
 
 
 
Probit models are appropriate models for ordinal variables such as the efficacy items used here.  
In equation 1 above, the response (y) is modeled as the inverse of the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) that the respondent answered between two model derived thresholds.  Essentially, 
the model assumes an underlying continuous trait that is captured by the ordinal measurement.   
Second, I estimate logistic regression models for voting.  In these models, I use conditional 
coding to allow for respondents from both group A and B to be include and maximize the sample 
size. 
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In equation 2 pre-election efficacy, A1 is entered as in interaction term with a binary variable 
(group A) that is coded “1” for individuals in group A.  Similarly, pre-election efficacy B1 is 
entered as an interaction with a binary variable coded “1” for individuals in group B.  Because 
individuals in group B have the value of “0” on Group A, B3 is interpreted as the effect of efficacy 
1 on voting probability among respondents in group 1.  Similarly, because individuals in Group  A 
have a value of “0” on Group B, B4 is interpreted as the effect of political efficacy 1 on voting for 
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individuals in group B. All eight of the efficacy variables are entered into the logistic regressions 
in this manner.   
 The final set of multivariate models are probit models predict post-election efficacy using 
the candidate that individuals voted for as the primary independent variable and controlling for the 
corresponding time 1 efficacy measure. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
My final sample size for this project was 1420, although sample sizes for some models 
were smaller. Table 1 shows the range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the 
sample for each variable in question. My final sample was 54.08% white, 26.62% black, 16.06% 
Hispanic and 3.24% other races. 58.38% of the sample was female. The mean age of the sample 
was 48.42, the average number of years of education was 13.54, and the mean household income 
was 14.49. 36.97% of the sample was not working, and 54.58% was not married, while the mean 
number of children among the sample was .67. Also, 46.9% of the sample indicated that they were 
N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
White 1873 0 1 .5408 -- -- --
Black 1873 0 1 .2662 -- -- --
Hispanic 1873 0 1 .1606 -- -- --
Other 1873 0 1 .0324 -- -- --
Age 1873 18 93 48.3700 16.6810 .2630 -.6500
Male 1873 0 1 .4162 -- -- --
Female 1873 0 1 .5838 -- -- --
Years of Education 1873 1 17 13.5400 2.4000 -.6360 1.3110
Household Income 1873 1 25 14.4900 5.9750 -.3490 -.4560
Not working full time 1873 0 1 .3697 -- -- --
Not married 1873 0 1 .5458 -- -- --
Number of Children 1869 0 7 .6700 1.0850 1.6420 2.1480
From the South 1873 0 1 .4690 -- -- --
Voted for President in 2008 1873 0 1 76.5700 -- -- --
Voted for Obama in 2008 1423 0 1 .6535 -- -- --
Voted for McCain in 2008 1423 0 1 .3317 -- -- --
Efficacy 1 1873 1 999 504.5194 498.4403 -.0160 -2.0010
Efficacy 2 1873 1 999 506.1714 497.6405 -.0190 -2.0010
Efficacy 3 1873 1 999 506.1262 498.3386 -.0220 -2.0010
Efficacy 4 1873 1 999 506.1119 498.1356 -.0210 -2.0010
Efficacy 5 1873 1 999 497.5767 498.0879 .0140 -2.0020
Efficacy 6 1873 1 999 498.2475 498.0610 .0110 -2.0020
Efficacy 7 1873 1 999 498.8704 498.2972 .0080 -2.0020
Efficacy 8 1873 1 999 498.8355 498.1179 .0090 -2.0020
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (N=1420)
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from the south. 75.78% of the sample reported voting in the 2008 presidential election; 65.35% 
for Barak Obama, and 33.17% for John McCain. Finally, the mean value of my pre-election 
efficacy questions ranged from 2.31 to 3.02, while the mean of post-efficacy measures ranged from 
2.55 to 3.07 that they were from the south.  
 
Predictors of Political Efficacy 
 To measure the variance in efficacy perceptions explained by my set of independent 
variables, I ran eight regression models, each of which utilized a different time 1 efficacy measure 
as its dependent variable. Model 1 measured how independent variables affected whether 
respondents thought that government was too complicated. In this model, three of my independent 
variables were statistically significant: Hispanic respondents were less likely to report that 
government was too complicated than white respondents, and efficacy also increased with 
increases in education. Mean efficacy in model 1 was lower among female respondents than male 
respondents. The element of efficacy captured in Model 2 was whether respondents reported that 
they had a good understanding of political issues. In this model, both black and Hispanic 
respondents were statistically likely to report higher levels of efficacy than white respondents. 
Female respondents and respondents with more education also reported similarly. In addition, age 
was a statistically significant variable, and older respondents had a higher mean efficacy than 
younger respondents. Model 3 focused on whether respondents believed that public officials cared 
about what they thought, however no independent variables were found to be  
18 
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statistically significant. Model 4 measured variance in how much say respondents believed they 
had about what government does, and only two variables were found to be statistically significant. 
Respondents who identified as a part of “other” racial groups reported higher levels of “say in 
government”, as did respondents with more education.  
Model 5 measured a similar “complicated” concept to Model 1. In this model, black 
respondents reported higher levels of efficacy than white respondents, and the variables for female 
and education behaved similarly to previous models. Model 6 also measured the “understand” 
concept measured in Model 2. Similar to previous models, black respondents had a higher mean 
efficacy than white respondents, as did older respondents and respondents with more years of 
education. In Model 7, which again measured whether respondents thought that public officials 
cared what respondents thought, four variables were found to be statistically significant. Both 
Hispanic respondents and respondents of other races were found to have higher mean responses 
for this question, as did older respondents. Income was also found to be a significant predictor of 
this variable, and respondents with more income were found to have higher levels of efficacy. 
Finally, three variables were found to be statistically significant predictors in model 8, which 
measured variance in respondents’ perceptions of their say in government. Both black and 
Hispanic respondents had higher levels of efficacy in this model than white respondents. Also 
respondents with more education were more likely to report more say in government affairs.  
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Predictors of Political Participation 
 I measured the effect of minority status on political participation in four logistic regression 
models that utilized “voted” as their dependent variable. Each model included race as its primary 
independent variable and also included a number of other variables to present a well-rounded 
understanding of the racial effect.  
 In addition to race, Model 1 included several control variables, including age, sex, number 
of children, and region. Of these variables, I found black, Hispanic, age, sex, number of children, 
and region to be statistically significant. Black respondents’ odds of voting were approximately 
1.567 times higher than white respondents, while Hispanic respondents’ odds of voting were in 
fact lower—almost half that of white respondents. Among control variables, respondents’ odds of 
voting increased with age (odds of voting increased .018 with each additional year), sex (females 
 
Coefficient Exp(B) Coefficient Exp(B) Coefficient Exp(B) Coefficient Exp(B)
Black 0.494 * 1.567 0.402 * 1.495 0.981 * 2.667 0.856 * 2.353
Hispanic -0.469 * 0.587 -0.526 * .591 0.006  1.006 -0.104  0.901
Other -0.350  0.690 -0.426  .653 -0.445  0.641 -0.519  0.595
Age 0.020 * 1.018 0.020 * 1.021 0.029 * 1.029 0.029 * 1.029
Female 0.436 * 1.448 0.563 * 1.756 0.496 * 1.642 0.583 * 1.791
Education --  -- --  -- 0.254 * 1.289 0.221 * 1.247
Income --  -- --  -- 0.062 * 1.064 0.058 * 1.060
Not Working --  -- --  -- 0.132  1.142 0.121  1.129
Single -0.627 * 0.541 -0.569 * 0.566 -0.271  0.762 -0.259  0.772
Number of Children -0.084  0.919 -0.072  0.931 -0.067  0.935 -0.056  0.946
From the South -0.233 * 0.786 -0.253 * 0.777 -0.180  0.836 -0.200  0.818
Efficacy 1 --  -- 0.173 * 1.188 -- -- 0.096  1.101
Efficacy 2 --  -- 0.364 * 1.438 --  -- 0.297 * 1.346
Efficacy 3 --  -- -0.087  0.917 --  -- -0.057  0.945
Efficacy 4 --  -- 0.286 * 1.331 --  -- 0.255 * 1.29
Efficacy 5 --  -- 0.317 * 1.373 --  -- 0.239 * 1.27
Efficacy 6 --  -- 0.455 * 1.576 --  -- 0.378 * 1.46
Efficacy 7 --  -- -0.119  0.888 --  -- -0.109  0.897
Efficacy 8 --  -- 0.166 * 1.18 --  -- 0.144  1.154
Control 0.607 * 0.153 -1.880 * 0.153 -4.399 * 0.012 -5.84 * 0.003
Model 4: All Variables
Table 4: Logistic Regression Models for Voting (N=923)
Model 3: Race, Controls, 
and SES
Model 1: Race and Controls
Model 2: Race, 
Controls, and Efficacy
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were 1.448 times more likely to vote), but decreased with the respondents’ number of children 
(odds decreased by .81) and region of country (southern respondents’ odds of voting were only 
78.6% that of respondents from other regions).  
 In Model 2, I added my 8 efficacy measures as independent variables in addition to race 
and control measures. Just as in model 1, black and Hispanic variables were statistically significant 
predictors of voting: black respondents were 1.495 times more likely to vote than white 
respondents, while Hispanic respondents were only .591 times as likely. Age and sex were also 
statistically significant, and predicted voting similarly to the first model. Neither number of 
children nor region predicted voting in model 2, but marital status did: Single people had odds of 
voting that were 43.4% lower than their married counterparts. Additionally, several efficacy 
measures (measures 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8) were also significant predictors of voting, and all 
statistically significant efficacy measures behaved in the same way. That is, increases in political 
efficacy among these variables all correspond with strong increases in odds of voting. 
 Model 3 was inspired by scholarship that attributed lowered rates of political participation 
among minorities to minority/white discrepancies in socioeconomic status, and therefore included 
additional variables to control for income, education, and occupation. Efficacy variables were not 
considered. In model 3, as in previous models, older respondents and female respondents were 
more likely to vote. Also, increases in education and income increased respondents’ odds of voting 
by .289 and .064 respectively. Hispanic identification was no longer a significant predictor of 
voting behavior, but black respondents odds-ratio was even higher in this model than in models 1 
and 2—in fact, black respondents were 2.667 times more likely to vote in 2008 according to this 
model. 
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Finally, model 4 was a full model including race and efficacy variables, as well as both 
socioeconomic and other control variables. In this model, I found black respondents to be 2.353 
times more likely to vote than white respondents. Age, education, income, and sex all behaved 
similarly to model 3, and there was some statistical significance among the added efficacy 
variables; efficacy measures 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 were all statistically significant predictors of voting, 
and respondents who indicated higher perceptions of political efficacy were more likely to vote. 
Effect of Candidate Racial Identity 
 To evaluate how Obama’s election affected respondents’ perceptions of efficacy, 8 more 
probit models were run, using the eight time-2 efficacy measures as dependent variables. These 
were full models that included the all aforementioned independent and control variables, and also 
controlled for respondents’ time-1 efficacy responses. The main focus of these models was to 
identify whether the respondents’ who had voted for Barak Obama were more likely to feel 
increases in their perceptions of political efficacy. 
 Overall, statistically significant variables were less common in these models, and trends 
were ultimately similar to corresponding time-1 efficacy models (described above). For example, 
the direction of the effect of racial identity was split; both Hispanic respondents and respondents 
of other races had significantly lowered mean efficacy values in model 1, while black respondents 
reported higher levels of efficacy in model 2. Sex, education, and income were similarly found to 
be statistically significant: female respondents reported lower mean efficacy values in models 1, 
2, and 6. Respondents with higher income levels reported higher levels of efficacy in model 4. 
Education was by far the most compelling independent variable in these 8 models—education had 
a statistically significant positive impact on respondents’ efficacy perceptions in models 1, 2, 3, 
24 
 
and 4. Finally, respondents who voted for Barak Obama had perceptions of efficacy that were 
significantly higher in models 3, 7, and 8.  
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DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 1: Racial minorities will have lower perceptions of political efficacy than white 
respondents. The findings from my study demonstrate a break in the theoretical causal chain that 
was established in the introduction of this paper. In my literature review, I discussed a series of 
studies that together posited lower levels of political efficacy among racial minorities, due 
simultaneously to negatively construed racial identities and to disparately distributed resources 
among different racial groups. However, my first eight probit models demonstrated that the 
relationship between race and political efficacy was not quite this simple. In models where racial 
variables were considered to be statistically significant, they positively influenced dependent 
efficacy variables. That is, respondents who identified as black, Hispanic, or other were often 
found to have mean efficacy values that were higher than their white counterparts, in direct contrast 
to my literature review and my related hypothesis. Thus, while I was able to reject my null 
hypotheses that there was no statistically significant relationship between race and political 
efficacy, I had to reject my substantive hypothesis that minority groups would have lower rates of 
political efficacy than whites.  
 It is perhaps unsurprising that results were inconsistent across 8 models with different 
dependent variables. Although I have every confidence that each efficacy measure captured some 
element of the concept, the various questions might be interpreted in different ways. This is 
particularly true for the models that used external, rather than internal concepts of efficacy, such 
as model 3. This model measured how independent variables affected respondents’ perceptions of 
how much their public officials cared about what they thought, but almost no variance was 
explained by the model, and no coefficients were found to be statistically significant. A great deal 
more statistical significance was found in those models that used dependent variables measuring 
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internal efficacy. While this pattern is compelling, it is made less so by the imbalance between 
internal and external efficacy concepts that are measured by efficacy variables in the dataset.  
 The indirect connection between racial elements and efficacy perceptions, which was 
captured by control variables, sheds a little light on the complex relationship between the two 
concepts. Mainly, the consistent positive effect of my education variable may help to explain this 
unique pattern. Increases in education resulted in corresponding increases in political efficacy in 
all but two of my models. In fact, the only models in which this pattern was not present were 
Models 3 and 7, which were the only two models that used an external efficacy concept as a 
dependent variable. This positive association is well established in the extant literature, but the 
relationship may be even stronger than I had previously anticipated. I posit that my choice to 
control for education is what resulted in the reverse relationship of minority respondents; the 
uneven distribution of educational resources in the U.S. accounts for disparate levels of political 
efficacy. Overall, the connection between race and efficacy in my study is difficult to understand 
without further exploration, but it certainly seems surprising that racial groups tended to report 
higher efficacy perceptions than the white majority 
 Hypothesis 2:  Racial minorities will have lower rates of political participation than white 
respondents. This unanticipated relationship between race and efficacy perceptions may be partly 
responsible for the most compelling, consistent, and surprising finding of my project, which is that 
black respondents were much more likely to vote in 2008 than any other racial group. This 
increased likelihood was in no way slight or gradual, but rather substantial, with odds that more 
than doubled in some models. This pattern is in direct opposition to the plethora of studies that 
posit lower rates of political behavior among minority citizens. That said, my Hispanic dummy 
variable was found to be significant in two of the models, in which Hispanic respondents had much 
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lower odds of voting than whites. However, black was a statistically significant variable with a 
positive coefficient in all models, which means that, while I rejected my null hypothesis that there 
is no statistical relationship between race and voting behavior, I also did not support my substantive 
hypothesis that racial minorities were less likely to vote than white respondents.  
 Often, contrasting literature on race and political behavior attributes lower rates of voter 
turnout among minority groups to spurious causes, such as lowered socioeconomic status, thus 
arguing that turnout rates would be different if socioeconomic status were not a factor(). Some of 
these studies even argue that rates of participation would increase if socioeconomic status was 
controlled for. According to the logic of these studies, minority respondents should have decreased 
political participation before socioeconomic status is accounted for, but much higher political 
participation once these controls are added. My series of logistic regression models demonstrates 
that this explanation does not properly address the observed phenomenon. Specifically, model 3 
shows that black respondents had odds of voting that were over two and a half times higher than 
white respondents when controlling for socioeconomic status—a positive relationship predicted 
by the aforementioned literature. But model 1 does not control for socioeconomic status, and still 
shows that black respondents were much more likely to vote than white respondents.  
 Hypothesis 3: Respondents’ lowered efficacy will result in similarly lowered political 
participation. These logistic regression models also yielded interesting results for my third 
hypothesis. A number of efficacy variables were statistically significant, and all had a positive 
effect on respondents’ odds of voting. This was true in all models that included efficacy measures. 
Thus, I accept my third hypothesis that respondent perceptions of political efficacy have a positive 
impact on political participation. Once again, the distinction between internal and external efficacy 
can shed a great deal of light on those efficacy measures that were considered statistically 
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significant in my logistic regression models. In both models that included efficacy measures, I 
found almost all internal efficacy variables to be statistically significant, and they all increased 
respondents’ odds of voting. In contrast, external efficacy variables (efficacy measures 3 and 7) 
were never found to be significant predictors of voting. This finding extends research about the 
positive relationship between efficacy and voting by highlighting the specific effect of internal 
efficacy as a factor that increases an individual’s odds of voting. 
 Hypothesis 4: Respondents who voted for Barak Obama in 2008 will have increased levels 
of political efficacy after the 2008 election. It is difficult to tell from this study alone why my 
findings were so different from past literature, but one of the most prominent differences between 
this project and those reviewed in my introduction is that the 2008 election introduced a 
presidential candidate who shared a racial identity with vulnerable minority groups. In my various 
regression models, I controlled for SES, for efficacy, and for a number of other variables, but my 
findings seemed consistent: regardless of race, or class, or perceptions of efficacy, black citizens 
were determined to vote in the 2008 presidential election. That being said, my findings on the role 
of Obama as a candidate are much murkier. Respondents who voted for Obama were shown to 
have higher perceptions of political efficacy in three of my eight probit models that explored this 
hypothesis. Thus, I was able to reject my fourth null hypothesis, that there was no relationship 
between candidate choice and political efficacy. However, the level of variance explained by these 
eight models was relatively low, and it is difficult to tell from this analysis whether increases in 
time-2 efficacy were due mainly to candidate choice or to spurious factors, such as race or 
socioeconomic status.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This study explored the relationships between race, political efficacy, and political 
behavior by examining a “causal chain” established in the extant literature. In theory, racial 
minorities are bound to have lower levels of political efficacy as a result of political stigmatization 
and lowered access to resources such as education and income. This lowered efficacy would, in 
turn result in lowered levels of political participation among minority groups. However, the 
presence of a minority candidate (Barak Obama) in the 2008 presidential election may have 
affected the traditional relationship between these three concepts. To explore these connections, I 
tested four hypotheses: (H1) Racial minorities will have lower perceptions of political efficacy 
than white respondents; (H2) Racial minorities will have lower rates of political participation than 
white respondents; (H3) Respondents’ lowered efficacy will result in similarly lowered political 
participation; (H4) Respondents who voted for Barak Obama in 2008 will have increased levels of 
political efficacy after the 2008 election. 
 My findings demonstrated that the relationship between race, efficacy, and political 
behavior was much more complex in 2008 than past research suggests. I was only able to accept 
two of my four hypotheses, but rejected all four null hypotheses and found that many of my 
primary independent variables were statistically significant predictors of dependent variables, 
albeit in the opposite direction to what past literature suggested. This seems to suggest that 
Obama’s candidacy did indeed affect the attitudes and behaviors of minority voters, although the 
strength of the impact cannot be known without further research.  
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In the past 50 years political science and sociological scholarship has demonstrated a 
consistent white-minority gap in political attitudes and behaviors. However, recent developments 
in the national political scene have introduced a new element that likely impacts these well-
established trends, and must be taken into account: Barak Obama, an individual identifying with a 
minority group, ran for the office of the president of the United States. To explore the impact of 
Obama’s presence on the political behavior of minorities, I performed a secondary data analysis 
of variables from both the pre-election and post-election modules of the ANES 2008 Time-Series 
study, and examined four hypotheses: (H1) Racial minorities will have lower perceptions of 
political efficacy than white respondents; (H2) Racial minorities will have lower rates of political 
participation than white respondents; (H3) Respondents’ lowered efficacy will result in similarly 
lowered political participation; (H4) Respondents who voted for Barak Obama in 2008 will have 
increased levels of political efficacy after the 2008 election. The results are compelling: literature 
states that many racial differences in efficacy and voting are due to moderating factors such as 
differences in SES, but I've found that black citizens were in fact far more likely to vote in 2008 
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regardless of whether or not SES was controlled for. I've also found statistical significance in each 
of the relationships highlighted in my hypotheses. 
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